formed on traditional institutions, and philosophical systems whose momentum has been largely spent, would never repeat again. After the historical periods of the "Cold War" and disintegration of the communist societies, we witness nowadays one of the phenomena in the modem international law history that could be qualified as the New International Legal Order. The current law system that arose from the new social structure has an important task to legitimate the new political status quo after the outstanding territorial changes have occurred. The traditional rules included in the universal legal order do not, however, lose their validity for the lack of support of the ideological. The existence of the international law system is becoming more dependent on the efficiency of the international community power whose functions of distribution and delegation of the State competences are applied constructively on the new situation and on the new realistic ground.
Since its beginning till the present days international law has appeared to be constantly in need ofjustification. The present development in international law goes to its very foundations. The theoretical examination of the New International Legal Order is not based on the a priori way, but it is in a conjugation with the general theory of the State and law. In conformity with the ontology that everything is changed but nothing lost (omni mutantur, nihil interit), international law has anticipated the existing norms that are developing new legal solutions connected with the State as a subject of international law. The history shows that the essential changes have taken place in the sphere of regulation of the process of "the birth and dying of States". Having stated that the attitude of States towards international law is a very actual problem of global relations is an answer to the question what international law criteria of statehood shape, as a part of the New International Legal Order, what makes it appear highly significant. International relations of "new States" and "old States" are still in the phase of development, and it is very difficult to ascertain with precision what changes have a quantitative as well as a qualitative character. One of the reasons is emergence of the post-modem State based on behaviour that changes the traditional State sovereignty.
In positive international law based upon the a priori and a posteriori judgments on "the succession of the State sovereignty", the ground for an ideal importance of the State and legal order in space is certainly establishment or extension of a State sovereignty with the timely conditioned exclusion of another State sovereignty (expulsion). This logical explanation follows the conclusion that sovereignty gets changed in legally formulated modalities, but it does not get transferred. International law as an advanced legal order is in conformity with the concept of a relative effect of the State sovereignty that regulates indirectly the division of competences and executes the supervision of their State performed realization. The fundamental reason for that divisibility is a wide range of international actors from States to international organizations, legal persons or individual entities who articulate an emerging consensus relating to the new international law principles and rules. In many instances, particularly in the United Nations (UN), pragmatism as well as political and economic factors plays an increasingly important role. The present international law is governed by the idea of a higher law order, and it is primarily the result of acceptance of commonly agreed rules of conduct. 2 Reflecting the political changes in Europe and the Soviet Union in early 1990s, we can see that the traditional international law criteria could not promote attainment of statehood through its operative norms. Focusing its greater attention to the new States that emerged with the break-up of the SFR Yugoslavia after 1991, the international community has faced many legal problems resulting from the new legal approach. Reopening of the questions of self-determination, secession, recognition, succession of States and boundaries resulted from the State dissolution. The Yugoslav case became a decision point of a series of pragmatical novelties and served as a catalyst for its further development in international law. A comprehensive analysis of the new attitude goes far beyond the scope of the present study and I could here only recall the next conclusions.
"DEVELOPMENT RULES" OF RECOGNITION OF THE NEW BALKAN STATES
When the succession of SFR Yugoslavia occurred, five new States were established -Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The central question that arouse, was whether the legal effects following the new factual situation immediately affected other States, or whether they depended on an act of recognition.
In assessing the mechanism of State recognition in public international law, I have to stress that recognition played an important role in the process of acquisition of statehood. In the context of creation of statehood, recognition perhaps appeared as constitutive or declaratory, what depends on the fact whether it is an act of international law or an act of political character'
The comparative analysis of latest State practice, particularly in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has been complicated by the fact that recognition is often used as a political instrument to express approval or disapproval of a new State, government or legality of the territorial changes. On the other side, recognition keeps an average position that conforms to the general principles of international law. Evidently, the problem presupposes existence or disappearance of the State, what remains the matter of fact. The legal status of the State extends beyond the sphere of the internal legal order, it extends to the political and social spheres of international existence. Hence, recognition by other States has a purely declaratory character and means acknowledgment of a factual situation that is bound to fulfilling the basic conditions of statehood. Those conditions were very simple from the traditional point ofview. The State had to have a defmed territory,a permanent population and effective control over the territory and population.' The nature of conditions was not the same and somewhere and sometimes third States claimed one additional condition tie with capacity to enter inter-State relations. All these "criteria" are in present times subject to the State interpretation in the light of facts and according to the factual situation.5 The recent practice in the Yugoslav case could not lead to clear and unequivocal answers. The notion of recognition of the new Balkan States has political and legal aspects.v International law played the primary role in the legal evolution of the process and the principles of international law serve to define the conditions upon which an entity constitutes a State. Therefore, the question is, if recognition of new States in the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia was a legal act and, as such, produced certain legal effects, what could these effects be other than fulfilment of a final condition of statehood?
The practice of recognition of the new Balkan States was a prerequisite act that conferred statehood and at the same time it was a presumption for establishment ofcomplete and normal international relations with other States. In legal sense, it was not in conformity with the constitution, but it had an affirmative role for their political existence. After the recognition, it was clear that all rules and principles of general international law governing the relations between sovereign States in international community were applicable ipsojure to the new Balkan States'?
Today, recognition by means of an international decision is peculiar for the United Nations (UN) as the universal organization with an objective international personality. UN plays an important role in matters of recognition. It has a sole authority to determine with a binding effect for the international community as a whole, whether the conditions of statehood are fulfilled in each specific case. It can make a preliminary decision concerning the admission of a new member States (Article 4 (1) Commission underlined that such a recognition along with membership in international organizations, bore witness to these States conviction that the political entity so recognized was a reality and conferred on it certain rights and obligations under international law. Further position of the Commission's Opinion n°10 of the same date purported attitude that recognition was a discretionary act that other States might perform when they choose and in a manner of their own choosing, subject only to compliance with the imperatives of general international law.
Extraordinary significance for "development rules" of international law has requirements for recognition made by the European Community in the Guidelines on Recognition ofNew States in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union on 16 December 199L1oMember States ofthe European Community co-ordinate their actions of recognition of those new States in U .>ctlkans that seek independence. The Guidelines applicable standards include the following requirements for recognition: • respect of the UN Charter and the commitments subscribed to in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.I! 1990 Charter of Paris for aNew Europe,12 especially with regard to the "rule of law, human rights and democracy"; • guarantees for the rights of minorities in accordance with commitments subscribed to in the framework of CSCE; • respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; • respect for all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; • anticipation of commitment to settle by agreements, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes.
With the Declaration of Yugoslavia adopted on the same date, EC invited all former Yugoslav Republics to state by 23 December whether they wished to be recognized as independent States and whether they accepted the obligations contained in the Guidelines. 13 The application for recognition with additional commitments elaborated within the framework of The Hague Peace Conference was to be submitted to the Arbitration Commission for legal advice. After the Commission's affirmative Opinions n? 4, 5, 6, and 7, all of 11 January 1992,14 EC Member States recognized former Yugoslav Republics as independent States.l> That was the crucial deviation from the customary practice regarding recognition of States. In spite of the fact that all conditional collective or individual recognitions lead to the constitutive conception, a declarative character of the State recognition that was primordial for the accession of the new Balkan States to the international community, cannot be put in question. With regard to the adopted EC principles, the Guidelines will surely become a mechanism in shaping the future international practice. At last, in comparison with the traditional criteria for existence of the State, the new approach only fixes the existing practice and instigates high evaluation of general international law.
NEW TACTICS IN THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION
Explication of the legal nature of State succession is directly conditioned by explanations that concern the very State and its sovereignty. In the New International Legal Order a ground for an ideal substance ofthe State is surely establishment or extension of the State sovereignty with the timely conditioned exclusion of another State sovereignty. In legal and logical sense, the succession of States is also a substitution of States the continuity of rights and liabilities. A logical explanation of State succession leads to justification that sovereignty is changed in legally formulated modalities. The State succession means legal succession, what proves that territorial changes must constitute a base for a certain legal norm (iusta causa). Pursuant to various types of territorial transformation, international law contains rules for dissolution, cession, secession and unification of the State. The rules embrace the principles ofjustice and they can evolve. Convinced of the need to identify de lege ferenda rules after the disintegration process in Europe and Soviet Union, the international community developed new legal regime in this domain in tum to provide better guarantees for the legal certainty in global relations.l'' It was oblivious that the case of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a model for the future international rehearsal.
With gradual expulsion of its sovereignty, produced mostly through violent practice, the former Yugoslavia was cracked by a progressive separation of its Republics. In the fIrst phase of the dissolution process of the This situation remained uncertain and the international community had to confront with various legal problems for a long time. For the reason that succession and continuity are not obligatory exclusive conceptions, the legal effects of the Yugoslav succession case become the central issue for which the Arbitration Commission of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia had to be counselled. In its Opinion n°1, the Arbitration Commission expressed the view that the situation in SFRY was the one involving the dissolution of States. The Commission admitted that the consequent emergence of the constituent Yugoslav Republics as independent States had not yet been complete. The process was regarded completed in the Commission's Opinion n°8. For the Commission dissolution of SFRY meant that the State had no longer international legal personality. It found that the existence of the federal State, made up of a number of separate entities, was seriously compromised when a majority of these entities, embracing a greater part of the territory and population, constituted themselves as sovereign States with the result that federal authority might no longer be effectively exercised. After admission of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to UN on 22 May 1992 (UN General Assembly resolutions -46/236; 46/237; 46/238), the Arbitration Commission reached the conclusion that the process of dissolution had been completed, and, that SFRY no longer existed.'? UN and other international organizations took an immediate action to purport these legal opinions. In its resolutions 756 and 777 (1992) the UN Security Council denied FRY's claim for the former Yugoslav seat in UN, considering that the State formerly known as the SFRY had ceased to exist and that FRY could not automatically continue the membership of the former Yugoslavia in the United Nations. The resolution of the General Assembly A/47/1 of 22 September 1992 followed the recommendation of the Security Council and it was decided that FRY should apply for membership. At the same time FRY was excluded from participation in its work. This conclusion was the ground for anticipation of the next General Assembly resolution A/48/88 (1993) that brought it to the end-the confused status of FRY in that organization. Afterwards, the same standpoint was reiterated in the resolution 1022 (1995) With regard to succession of treaties of the former SFR Yugoslavia it appears that it does not provide any great difference ofthat customary internationa11aw codificated in the Vienna Convention. Our case study shows that all successor States of the former SFRY have benefited from the "fast track" method of participating in international treaties through general declarations of succession in which they declared that they were bound as successors by the entire body of treaty law in force in respect of the State territory to which the succession relates. given situation becomes a matter of evaluation by other States as well by international organizations. One of the principal issues following the relevance of selfdetermination of the peoples of the former constitutive Republics of SFRY was that no consent was given by all actors in this process. At the beginning of the process of origination of the new States in the territory of the SFRY, FRY denied other former Yugoslav Republics the right to secession. On the other side, for Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, self-determination was a basic title for independence. Insisting on the peremptory character of the commitment to respect the right to selfdetermination (jus cognes), they maintained the approach that secession was their constitutional right. FRY had a traditional law attitude that secession represented an illegal act and flagrant violation of the internal and international law order to which the Predecessor State had a full right to oppose by all lawful means.
The EC Arbitration Commission was called to resolve this open legal question. It adopted opinion on the merit of this issue. That is to say, the Commission, acting within the framework of rules and principles of international public law, 'redefmed' the factual situation pertaining to the territorial status and status of borders of the republics of SFRY in a novel manner-? In connection with the current situation and on the basis of the principle of protection of the territorial integrity of the new State, the Arbitration Commission adopted Opinion n? 2, and strictly limited the scope of right to self-determination in the context of unstable and unclear situation. It noted that international law as it currently stood, did not spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination. The Commission stressed that self-determination could not be carried out in such a way as to change borders existing immediately prior independence. In accordance with this, in its Opinion n" 3 the Arbitration Commission insisted on recognition of internal administrative borders as international borders. The principle of preservation of borders that had existed at the moment when the new States gained independence thus became a general ground for demarcation between the new Balkan States (uti possidetis juris). 23 22 The arrangement for the above mentioned borders was derived from the fact that they represented "lines of demarcation that may be altered on the basis of free and mutual agreement", and, a contrario, those borders thus became international frontiers "protected by international public law". Merely, the effect of the principle uti possidetis is to "freeze" the legal title for possession of the territory at the moment when a new State has achieved independence. This interpretation may have been substantiated by the idea that the principle of respecting the territorial status quo may have also derived from the 1974 Constitution of SFRY (paragraph 2 and 4 ofArticle 5). The above mentioned Constitutional clauses prescribed irreversibility of borders of the Yugoslav Republics, unless the consent for change of borders was freely expressed. Thus, the formerly recognized principle of delimitation of the new States after the decolonisation in America and Africa, uti possidetis juris qui, has become a universal legal principle on the territorial delimitation that may be applicable to SFRY, too. Accepting the de facto situation, the Arbitration Commission stressed the security function of this principle under the circumstances that might lead to "fratricidal fights and endanger the stability and recently acquired independence ofthe new States".
While the collapse of SFRY was going on, the Arbitration Commission explicitly declared itself in favour of the attempt of seceding a part of the population in the former Yugoslav Republics. It pointed out that all ethnic, religious and language groups in a State had the right to recognition of their identity under international law. The application of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia for recognition as independent States should be granted, subject to the conditions, first, by full consultation of its people by a referendum, and second, by passing of amendments to the Croatian Constitution of the incorporation of more fully certain guarantees of human rights and the rights of minorities.
Provided for as the primary principle of the territorial integrity, by applying the method of argumentum a contrario the Arbitration Commission failed to reconsider all aspects of self-determination, this When analysing this part of the Commission's opinion, one should concentrate on the concrete research of the rules of international public law that the Commission stated as the basis for the opinion on inviolability of international borders of SFRY after the succession. Namely, Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect to Treaties has approved the principle of international public law prescribing that the succession of States does not include the issues of borders that had been determined by treaties, nor the rights and duties pertaining to border regime that had been determined by treaties. This principle is derived from the legal practice and the theory of international public law and is essentially based on the principle of sovereign equality of States that also prescribes for States' obligation to refrain from threats and use offorce in their relationship (Article 2 of the UN Charter). The 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Declaration of CSCE also covered up the principle of inviolability of borders. Since the international community is based on prohibition of interventionism aimed against the territorial integrity of States, it prescribed that the internationally recognized borders might be altered exclusively in a peaceful manner, on the basis of mutual consent of the interested parties. In accordance with the valid provisions of international public law that was subject to a particular political test in case of Yugoslavia, one may assume that all former Yugoslav Republics of the SFRY acquired internationally recognized borders, once they had gained independence. Via facti, the internal administrative borders were transformed into the international frontiers, while the international borders had remained the same, in accordance with the provisions of international public law on immutability of international borders. However, the first case represents the particular legal presumption that may be generally applicable to the situations at the moment when the new States gained independence. Still, this presumption does not have an absolute effect ratione temporis, as, in itself, it functionally suspends the effect of legal title until the moment the title has been confirmed. The confirmation of the legal title, on the other hand, always depends on the concrete capability of the particular party to prove the validity of the facts it had based its claims on. 25 On foundations of the above mentioned historic and legal facts that have been presented, the New International Legal Order encourages the particular legal discrepancy at the moment of the State succession that is linked with achievement of the right to self-determination. One should evaluate the affectivity at the moment when a State gained independence, and after that time, not merely in the light of social causes, but in the light of real events that should verify, inter alias the existence of a specific right. For this reasons, the New International Legal Order bends over factual situation and slowly but surely justifies effectiveness.
bivse SFRJ treba da podnese molbu za prijem u clanstvo ove univerzalne organizacije. Ministarski savet Evropske zajednice je 16. decembra 1991. godine usvojio poznati dokument pod nazivom, .Smemice 0 priznanju novih drzava u Istocnoj Evropi i Sovjetskom Savezu", kojim se modifikuju tradicionalni kriterijumi za davanje priznanja novim drZavama nastalim nakon dezintegracionih procesa u Istocnoj Evropi. Zajednicka politika Evropske zajednice izrazena kroz ovaj dokument, uz istovremeno usvojenu Deklaraciju 0 Jugoslaviji, po svom karakteru je strogo konstitutivna. Ona polazi od zelje da se nastupijedinstveno u odnosu na davanje priznanja novim drzavama nastalim na podrucju bivse SFRJ. Drzave naslednice SFRJ su u obavezi da prihvate odredbe Povelje UN, obaveze propisane Helsinskim finalnim aktom KEBS-a iz 1975. godine i Pariskom poveljom za novu Evropu iz 1990. godine, te posebno obaveze u pogledu postovanja demokratskih standarda, ljudskih i manjinskih prava iz nacrta Konferencije za bezbednost i saradnju u Evropi.
Ako se svemu tome doda i naglasena duznost u pogledu razoruzanja, obaveza dogovornog resavanja posledica sukcesije drzava, te postovanja nepovredivosti granica, onda je ocena spremnosti novih drzava da postuju postojece pozitivno pravo postala neophodan uslov za dobijanje medunarodnog priznanja. S obzirom da je priznanje diskreciono pravo svake drzave, njegovo kolektivno uslovljavanje davanjem izjava drzava sukcesora bivse SFR Jugoslavije 0 prihvatanju napred propisanih uslova Evropske zajednice, uz njihovo upucivanje na misljenje Arbitraznoj komisiji, predstavlja odstupanje u odnosu na klasicno shvatanje 0 deklarativnom priznanju drzava. Iako su drzave clanice Evropske zajednice propisale odredene uslove vezane za priznanje drzava, njih ne treba shvatiti isuvise usko, vee vise kao koordiniranu akciju vezanu za sprovodenje pojedinacnih politickih odluka. Ovi uslovi su, uz prihvatanje medunarodnih obaveza u vezi sa prijemom u Ujedinjene nacije i druge medunarodne organizacije, posluzili kao svojevrsni politicki test efektivnog vrsenja drzavne vlasti u odnosu na ostvarivanje prava na samoopredeljenje. Po svojoj sadrzini takav pristup ne odudara mnogo od normi pozitivnog medunarodnog prava. Pre bi se moglo zakljuciti da je procedura ostvarivanja priznanja drzava bila prihvacena u jednoj modifikovanoj formi kao kolektivni cin od znacaja za utvrdivanje postojanja drzava, Medutim, sam nastanak drzava de facto, nije bio dovoljan da bi se time stvorila jedna drzava, kao sto ni odbijanje priznanja medunarodnopravnog kontinuiteta nije bio dovoljan uslov kojim bi se dalo spreciti njegovo dalje postojanje. Opstanak drzave u potpunom odsustvu efektiviteta pravnoga poretka vezuje se za volju drugih drzava da priznaju ili ne priznaju jedan takav cin, To je najocitije na primeru gde su sve republike bivse Jugoslavije sticanjem nezavisnosti na spoljnom planu stekle i medunarodno priznanje granica. Administrativne medurepublicke granice su via facti .pretocene'' u medunarodne na osnovu dejstva principa uti possidetis juris, dok su medunarodne granice ostale konzervirane opstim pravilima medunarodnog prava 0 njihovoj nepromenljivosti. Sustinski se u prvom slucaju radilo 0 jednoj pravnoj prezumpciji, koja je generalno primenjiva u odnosu na fakticki zateceno stanje u momentu sticanja nezavisnosti u slucajevima postojanja izuzetno krhke bezbednosne situacije. Njeno pravno dejstvo ratione temporis ne moze medutim biti apsolutno, jer po prirodi stvari, funkcionalna suspenzija prava moze da traje iskljucivo do momenta njegove pravne konvalidacije. Koncept Novog medunarodnog pravnog poretka ima zadatak da izmiri postojeca razmimoilazenja izmedu faktickog i pravnog stanja usvajanjem progresivnih pravila koja kvalitativno treba da doprinesu visem stepenu zastite opstih medunarodnih interesa. Prelaz prava i obaveza krece se otuda u okvirima opstih medunarodnih standarda koji se nalaze izmedu antinomijskih principa legaliteta (ex injuria ius non oritur) i fakticiteta (ex factis ius oritur), uz uslov, quoad iura nich quoad defunctum, cime se ogranicava pravno dejstvo cinjenicnog stanja na pozitivni pravni poredak.
